Why did the once all conquering Israel Defence Force fail in the Second Lebanon War in 2006? This question was addressed in the just released Winograd Commission Report, the English summary which can be found here. The issue was also reflected upon in a 2007 academic paper by Raanan Lipshitz, to be found on Jeffrey Pfeffer and Bob Sutton's Evidence Based Management website.
The core of the findings of the Winograd Report are:
Seriously deficient decision making at all levels. Seriously deficient tactical and strategic thinking, planning and preparation. Indecisiveness once the war started, specifically on whether an air or ground offensive was required.
I quote one sentence from the report:
This outcome (not achieving the war's objectives) was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF's readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.
These finding are broadly similar to those of Lipshitz I've previously referred to. He specifically indicated that:
Management fads inherited from the US Army, including excessive context inappropriate jargon, led to poor communication and unclear and unmeasurable objectives. As an example, Lipshitz points to the difficulty to determine whether an abstract effect such as "shock and awe", has been achieved. Extremely limited training of ground forces due to limited budgets. Excessive reliance of high technology where simpler solutions should have been preferred, i.e the use of smart bombs where area bombing would have been more effective. Lack of mindful, critical thinking, common sense and an evidence based approach. Instead management fads and business jargon reigned.
There is a lesson in this not only for military organisations, but also for other branches of public service and even business. The lesson is that inappropriately applied management methods and fads can severely damage such organizations, even lose wars.
For armies, Von Clausewitz is to be preferred to Tony Robbins.
Hi Leon,
ReplyDeleteI was watching an interesting documentary on tele over the weekend on the Tenerife air disaster of 1977 which is still believed to be the worst aviation accident to date.
Of course, with hindsight we are able to connect all the dots, and what was interesting to me was the perceived lack of 'critical thinking' exhibited by the highly experienced pilot.
According to investigators his behavior was partly driven by performance measures instituted by KLM which in this case had serious unintended consequences.
A long story to get to my point: I wonder how much thought (critical or otherwise) is given to potential consequences of performance measures and incentives. I also wonder how often the seemingly illogical behavior of people can be attributed to this, and how many wars, elections, lives have been lost (or started)?
Sonja
ReplyDeleteYou make an interesting point. Even rational decisions are never totally rational - emotion, intuition, motivations, etc., always play a role.
The Tenerife air disaster had another element to it, failure to challenge authority, even in the face of loomimg disaster. If I recall the incident correctly, the co-pilot of the KLM jet failed to challenge the captain, even though he realised the danger.
We are be able to teach critical thinking as a skill, but we also need to attend to the moral courage to use that skill in the face of authority. Of course in wartime, that could land you in front of a firing squad!